RE: "Saving Faith"
*Update: Shortly after being released, “Saving Faith” has been removed from publication.
John Gee, Egyptology Professor at Brigham Young University, recently published a book titled, “Saving Faith.” In the book, he refutes a commonly held belief that Latter-day Saint youth are “leaving in droves.” According to the book’s description, the book discusses factors as to why youth are leaving the faith, as well as practices that sustain and encourage faith. In Chapter 7 he dedicates a section to homosexuality. He cites many studies and discusses possible causes, but ultimately fails to make a significant argument within regards to morality or causality.
The complexities of morality cannot be reduced to causality. By the author’s own admission, “It is not clear how helpful it is to stereotype how any individual may have come under the homosexual classification. No single cause for homosexuality has been discovered, and a persistent problem with scientific studies of homosexuality is the pervasive assumption that there must be a single cause.” (191) The fixation on finding a cause or single cause to homosexuality in the name of “morality” is a misguided approach. Yet, for ten pages he discusses studies and potential causes of homosexuality based on stereotypes, including a subsection on sexual abuse. In the subsection “Abuse,” he claims, “homosexuality is related to childhood sexual abuse,” which is a stereotype that has been widely discredited. (195)
He subversively suggests that looking for a cause of homosexuality is deemed homophobic by activists but fails to state why. (189) Looking for causation alone is not homophobic. Looking for a causation with the assumption of “reorientation” is the problem. (199-200) Gee cites, Professor Camille Paglia, herself a lesbian, “The widespread desire to find a biological basis for homosexuality seems to me very misconceived. It will inevitably lead to claims that gays are developmentally defective at the prenatal level.” (190) Sadly, this view is derived from the idea that homosexuality is a defect and automatically undesirable. This view is birthed from homophobia because it is already assumed that homosexuality is wrong before we even began the search for a cause. If the search is motivative with the intent to eradicate and delegitimize the loving relationship among homosexuals, then yes, the search for a cause is homophobic. If we are simply seeking understanding and exploration in the production of knowledge, then the search itself is not homophobic.
In context, BYU has a well-established history of weaponizing science, theories of causality, and sexual fluidity against the queer community. From conversation therapy to anti-queer theologies, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has demonstrated a repeated pattern of heterosexism and homophobia. There are legitimate reasons why a queer person would be skeptical of a BYU Egyptology professor coming up with theories of causality when those theories have been actively used to exclude, harm, and abuse the queer community, even at BYU.
The problem is most clearly stated by Gee himself, “The Church has taken the position that the practice of homosexuality is wrong and a sin―those who engage in homosexual behavior cannot remain members of the Church in good standing” (189) This is the problem. This is the sentence that all other sentences in this section of homosexuality are influenced by. This is the crux of the argument. At the end of the day, the Church has stated homosexuality is wrong―“a sin”―and the studies and theories shared in the book are designed to uphold that belief. The idea of causality is not simply an innocent exploration of homosexuality. To a certain extent, it does not matter what the cause of homosexuality is because the Church has explicitly “taken the position” that homosexuality is sinful. The pursuit of causality, in this case, is indeed, without a doubt, motivated by homophobia and heterosexism.
The tricky thing about morality within religion is that almost anything can be deemed “moral or immoral” by the community. If a religious community does not like dark skin, they can come up with all sorts theological interpretations to marginalize them, including using scientific racism to support their bigotry. Likewise, some religious groups drink wine together, such as Jesus and his disciples at the last supper, while other groups abstain from alcohol entirely. Within the context of the Latter-day Saint imagination, wine can go from “sacrament” to “sin” so long as the religious body supports it as a “sin,” usually by authoritative decree. Reductively speaking, a religious authority and community can point to almost anything, and deem it is a “sin”―too many steps on the sabbath, women not covering their hair and face, left-handedness, people touching a menstruating woman, and, yes, homosexuality. I agree with Gee when he states there is confusion about the source of morality. (153) However, the confusion is not about young people having an undeveloped source of morality. The difficulty is finding an agreed moral framework composed of both individual and communal desires, actions, and effects. When people confuse a flawed authoritative decree as objective morality, yes, there will be confusion and problems.
Morality is constructed from the idea that “I don’t like that thing, so you need to stop that thing.” Sometimes our disgust is justified, such as child sex slavery--which is deeply harmful and immoral. Other times it is not, such as being left-handed--which is somewhat inconsequential and is a mere matter of orientation. It all starts from our inner desires that say, “I don’t like that thing, so you need to stop that thing.” We do not need to find a genetic component to left-handedness to decide if it is moral or immoral. If enough people do not like it, they can point to it and call it “sin,” and make it a sin by virtue of decree. Quite literally the Church can say, “It’s a sin because I said it’s a sin” and then have adherents believe they are doing this in the name of God without admitting or recognizing their hand in constructing morality.
If we are going to construct a moral framework around homosexuality, we need to stop thinking the construct begins with whether a person has a “gay gene” or was sexually abused as a child. Morality conversations start with “I don’t like that thing, so you need to stop that thing,” or in other words, “It’s a sin because I said it’s a sin.” We need to figure out if “that thing” causes genuine harm or is simply a difference in preference or orientation. Causality alone, even scientific causality, is not enough to determine morality.
For example, scientists have discovered that there is a genetic link to persons who dislike cilantro. For some people cilantro tastes and smells soapy. Does this mean it is moral for people with the genetic component to refuse cilantro at the dinner table? Should they be forced to eat cilantro anyway just to be polite to those that like cilantro? Or do we concede that it is okay for some people to refuse cilantro, so long as they have the genetic component for it? What about people who just do not prefer it? Should they have to eat cilantro? Are we going to start genetically testing everyone to determine weather or not it is moral to refuse to eat cilantro based on causality? Did they grow up eating cilantro? Did they eat cilantro before and seem to enjoy it, but now claim they cannot stand the taste? What if they had a bad experience, got food poisoning, vomited up cilantro and now hate cilantro, even though they have no genetic component? If it is moral for people with a genetic component to refuse cilantro, why would it be immoral for a person who had a bad experience with cilantro to refuse cilantro? In summary, determining the morality of refusing cilantro is not so simple as determining causation. If you dislike cilantro, you should not have to eat cilantro regardless of if you simply had a bad experience or you are genetically predisposed to disliking cilantro. There is nothing immoral or moral about a taste preference.
The same is true of homosexuality. Let us hypothesize for a moment that there is a “gay gene” that can conclusively prove a biological component to homosexuality. If that is the case, what if there are persons who claim to be gay, but lack the “gay gene” in her diagnostics? Is this gay person delegitimate without her “gay gene”? Likewise, what if some bisexuals lack a “gay gene” in their genetic makeup? Does this mean they cannot have a homosexual relationship, but a lesbian with the “gay gene” can? Is the “gay gene” even helpful in determining morality anymore even if it helps us understand causality? Even if we know the cause of homosexuality is linked to a “gay gene,” how does that make it moral or immoral?
Instead of viewing homosexuality as a matter of love, orientation, and preference, it must be painted as a dangerous deviance to justify their obsession with causality. This has been frequently demonstrated by Latter-day Saint leaders and members. Take note that in Gee’s book―a book designed to refute the common assumption that youth are leaving the Church in droves―he cites homosexuality as contributing to youth’s decline in religious participation. (190) The purported dangers of homosexuality can justify conversion therapy, shaming tactics, social exclusion and alienation, clandestine confessionals, and a whole academic and scientific discourse into discovering causality. Whether by pastoral confessional or scientific practice, the causality of homosexuality must be discovered and cured by any means necessary.
It would not be surprising if the future of causality-based morality were to include a quasi-Gattaca approach to gender discrimination. Anything from genital examinations, chromosomal tests, hormonal tests, and DNA samples could be used to exclude people from the expression and inclusion of their gender or sexual orientation. Our bodies could be opened, dissected, invaded, and diagnosed in the name of, “Is she truly born that way?”
Essentially, it does not matter if a woman decides she is no longer interested in men and sets her sights on women by choice. If does not matter if a victim of rape, whether by her own choice or an involuntary biological reaction, no longer finds joy in sharing herself with a man. It does not matter if she was genetically “born that way” or became that way by kissing a woman in her mid-forties. It does not matter if she has a “gay gene,” if it is epigenetic or environmentally influenced. The cause alone is not enough to determine morality. If a person was a victim of sexual abuse and “caused” her to be homosexually inclined, so what? Her reaction to her experience, whether by choice, genetics, psychology, biology, or some combination is not going to be sanctioned by the Church when the search for causality is motivated by the conclusion that homosexuality is wrong regardless. The point is, “It’s a sin, because they said it’s a sin,” rendering their search for causality one more expression of their bigotry and justified by the false pretense that homosexuals are dangerous. The author admits that even the prevalence of homosexuality does not matter in determining morality. ‘If homosexuality is wrong, then it is wrong even if it is common.” (189)
This leads us back to the crux of the morality argument, which is not causality or prevalence, “It’s a sin, because I said it’s a sin.” As Gee stated, “The Church has taken the position that the practice of homosexuality is wrong and a sin.” (189) Like so many others, the Church pointed at a behavior or/and person they did not like or thought it was dangerous and called it “sin.” Even worse, they blamed their dislike of homosexuality, even bigotry, on God and told us stories of Heavenly Parents who disapproved of us. They spun a web of theologies, fed with “scientific data,” “academic research,” and “studies” to have us believe they were genuinely interested in understanding morality’s relationship with causality. Gee is not embarking in an innocent exploration of what causes homosexuality. In this case, the search for a cause to homosexuality is just a red herring to distract us from the fact the Church, like many others, pointed at homosexuality and said, “It’s a sin because I said it’s a sin.”
